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Abstract
Background: Armed violence is a major public health and humanitarian problem in Iraq. In this descriptive statistical
analysis we aimed to describe for the first time Iraqi civilian deaths caused by perpetrators of armed violence during the first
5 years of the Iraq war: over time; by weapon used; by region (governorate); and by victim demographics.
Methods and Findings: We analyzed the Iraq Body Count database of 92,614 Iraqi civilian direct deaths from armed
violence occurring from March 20, 2003 through March 19, 2008, of which Unknown perpetrators caused 74% of deaths
(n=68,396), Coalition forces 12% (n=11,516), and Anti-Coalition forces 11% (n=9,954). We analyzed the subset of 60,481
civilian deaths from 14,196 short-duration events of lethal violence to link individual civilian deaths to events involving
perpetrators and their methods. One-third of civilian violent death was from extrajudicial executions by Unknown
perpetrators; quadratic regression shows these deaths progressively and disproportionately increased as deaths from other
forms of violence increased across Iraq’s governorates. The highest average number of civilians killed per event in which a
civilian died were in Unknown perpetrator suicide bombings targeting civilians (19 per lethal event) and Coalition aerial
bombings (17 per lethal event). In temporal analysis, numbers of civilian deaths from Coalition air attacks, and woman and
child deaths from Coalition forces, peaked during the invasion. We applied a Woman and Child ‘‘Dirty War Index’’ (DWI),
measuring the proportion of women and children among civilian deaths of known demographic status, to the 22,066
civilian victims identified as men, women, or children to indicate relatively indiscriminate perpetrator effects. DWI findings
suggest the most indiscriminate effects on women and children were from Unknown perpetrators using mortar fire (DWI
=79) and nonsuicide vehicle bombs (DWI =54) and from Coalition air attacks (DWI =69). Coalition forces had higher
Woman and Child DWIs than Anti-Coalition forces, with no evidence of decrease over 2003–2008, for all weapons combined
and for small arms gunfire, specifically.
Conclusions: Most Iraqi civilian violent deaths during 2003–2008 of the Iraq war were inflicted by Unknown perpetrators,
primarily through extrajudicial executions that disproportionately increased in regions with greater numbers of violent
deaths. Unknown perpetrators using suicide bombs, vehicle bombs, and mortars had highly lethal and indiscriminate effects
on the Iraqi civilians they targeted. Deaths caused by Coalition forces of Iraqi civilians, women, and children peaked during
the invasion period, with relatively indiscriminate effects from aerial weapons.
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Armed violence in war is an ongoing, significant public health
and humanitarian problem internationally [1–9]. A global
assessment of the burden of armed violence in 2004–2007 found
that persons living in Iraq had the highest risk of dying violently in
conflict, peaking at 91 violent deaths per 100,000 population in
2006 [7]. In 2009, we described patterns of civilian death caused
by different weapons used in the Iraq war, and highlighted
weapon-effects on children and female civilians [10]. Here, we
analysed the perpetrators of armed violence in Iraq. We have also
expanded our analysis to describe civilian deaths by perpetrators
over time, by geographic area, to compare effects of weapons as
used by different perpetrators, and to compare the demographic
composition of their civilian victims.
Analysis of carefully documented civilian deaths caused by
perpetrators and their weapons improves understanding of their
impact on general public health as well as on vulnerable
demographic subgroups, creates a burden of responsibility, and
provides data on the nature and effects of violence to inform the
development of preventive policies [1–12]. The Iraq war has
involved both conventional state-to-state warfare and asymmetric,
irregular warfare, with continuous international media coverage
that has resulted in detailed reports on thousands of events causing
civilian death. Iraq Body Count (IBC), a nongovernmental
organization, has systematically collated a wide range of data from
such reports as a means to monitor and document Iraqi civilian
casualties from armed violence since the war’s beginning on March
20, 2003 [13,14]. The resulting database interlinks specific violent
events with their perpetrators, the weapons used, the individual
civilians killed, and the victim’s demographic characteristics. By
making links to perpetrators, civilian death can be examined not
only as an important public health outcome, but also as an indicator
of combatants’ compliance with laws of war that require the
protection of civilians from targeted or indiscriminate harm [7,15].
Laws of war are international humanitarian laws and customary
standards regarding the treatment of civilians and combatants (e.g.,
the Geneva Conventions) [15,16].
Our specific aims in this study were: (1) to describe Iraqi civilian
deaths attributable to perpetrators over time, specifically over the
first 5 y of the Iraq war; (2) to identify which forms of armed
violence used by various perpetrators caused the greatest numbers
of civilian deaths or killed the most civilians in an average event in
which a civilian died; (3) to describe the distribution of civilian
violent deaths across Iraq’s governorates and, because in 2009 we
identified extrajudicial executions as the most prevalent form of
violent death [10], to assess whether numbers of execution deaths
in governorates had a relationship to numbers of nonexecution
deaths and if so, what kind of relationship; (4) to describe the
demographic composition of perpetrators’ civilian victims over
time and by weapon in terms of deaths of men, women, and
children. We emphasize deaths of women and children because
they are identified as vulnerable populations in public health and
under laws of war [15,16]. Moreover, because women and
children are less often targeted than men in Iraq’s conflict [10], as
in most conflicts [17,18], high proportions of women and children
among victims can signal possible indiscriminate behavior or
weapons [5,10]. We measure proportional rates at which
perpetrators in Iraq generated a particularly unacceptable public
health and humanitarian outcome—killing women and children—
by using a Woman and Child ‘‘Dirty War Index’’ (DWI). The
DWI is a data-driven public health tool based on laws of war that can
systematically identify rates of a particularly undesirable or pro-
hibited, i.e., ‘‘dirty,’’ war outcome inflicted on populations during
armed conflict [15]. Our final aim was to compare military
opponents using a common weapon-type in war—small arms—to
see if they differed in causing deaths of Iraqi civilians, women, and
children by their gunfire.
Methods
The Database
The IBC database was prospectively developed by the authors
HD and JAS when an invasion of Iraq appeared imminent in
2003, with the aim of systematically recording and monitoring
deaths of individual Iraqi civilians from armed violence [13,14].
Data sources are mainly professional media reports, including
international and Iraqi press in translation. IBC uses key-word
searches to scan Internet-published, English-language press and
media reports of armed violence in Iraq directly resulting in
civilian death. This process uses search engines and subscription-
based press and media collation services (e.g., LexisNexis). Reports
are scanned from over 200 separate press and media outlets
meeting IBC’s criteria: (1) public Web-access; (2) site updated
daily; (3) all stories separately archived on the site, with a unique
URL; and (4) English as a primary or translated language. Sources
include dozens of Arabic-language news media that release violent
incident reports in English (e.g., Voices of Iraq and Al Jazeera
English), and report translation services such as the BBC
Monitoring Unit. The three most frequently used sources are
Reuters, Associated Press, and Agence France Presse. These and
other international media in Iraq increasingly employ Iraqis
trained in-house as correspondents. Media-sourced data are cross-
checked with, and supplemented by, data from hospitals, morgues,
nongovernmental organizations, and official figures [13].
For deaths to be added to the IBC database, at least one civilian
must be reported killed by the event, with the number of deaths
indicated in the source, and time and location adequately
described for IBC to avoid double-counting. IBC has found that
no single media source covers much more than half of all lethal
violent incidents reported, thereby requiring a systematic process
such as IBC’s to knit together media and other sources in order to
collate all reported violent deaths of civilians and to ensure that
deaths are not double-counted. Whenever possible on the basis of
reported data, IBC records a total of 18 variables for each lethal
event, including: time of event, location of event, presence of an
identifiable target, perpetrators, weapons, media sources, witness-
es, injuries, and name, sex, age, and occupation of each victim.
When accounts from independent sources differ, variables are
entered from reports with the most detail or the best-placed
informants (e.g., medical personnel attending to victims). Most
frequent informants for reported armed violence deaths are
morgue and hospital medics, police and other Iraqi official
sources, eyewitnesses, and relatives. When equally credible reports
differ on the number of deaths, minimum and maximum deaths
are recorded for the event. Entries are independently reviewed and
systematically error-checked by three IBC members before data
are published on IBC’s open Web site [13].
We analyzed the IBC database records updated as of July 12,
2010 for Iraqi civilian violent deaths that occurred during the first
5 y of the Iraq war, which began with the US-led Coalition
invasion on March 20, 2003: March 20, 2003 through March 19,
2008. We first analyzed the total database, which included deaths
from aggregate reports (hospital and morgue reports) and deaths
from violent events of any duration, to describe yearly and total
reported Iraqi civilian violent deaths by perpetrators. From this
total database, we extracted a dataset of civilian deaths attributable
to specific short-duration events. Short-duration events span no
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cause one or more reported direct civilian deaths (e.g., an
overnight air strike, a brief gunfire ground-engagement, an
isolated shooting). Analyzing short-duration events allows tighter,
more reliable linkages between a perpetrator’s use of a particular
weapon-type in a specific time and place, and their effects on
numbers killed and victim demographics. Use of limited-duration
events also allows comparison of perpetrators’ effects within a
uniform time span (in this case, two days).
Definitions
Iraqi civilian deaths as defined in the IBC database and this
study include all children, most women, all noncombatants, and
police carrying out regular, but not paramilitary, duties, as police
constitute part of civil society [19]. A child is under age 18, based
on the Convention on the Rights of the Child [20] and Iraqi law
that 18 is the voting age and age of consent [14]. Women and men
are adults aged 18 y or older, of known sex. Age was determined
on the basis of reported age in years, or reported age category as
‘‘child’’ or ‘‘adult’’ or adult occupation. Execution is the
extrajudicial killing of any abducted or captured individual by
any method. Executions include combatants subjected to extraju-
dicial execution postcapture, as after capture they become
noncombatants protected under international humanitarian law
[15,16].
Perpetrators
Iraq’s conflict environment is one in which perpetrators are
not equally identifiable when they harm Iraqi civilians. Coalition
forces are identifiable by uniforms, and in some cases (e.g.,
where aircraft are involved), by weapons. In contrast, sectarian
and Anti-Coalition insurgent forces routinely do not wear
uniforms or identifying marks during military actions [21–23].
Moreover, claims of responsibility for attacks, if made at all, are
unreliable, and responsibility may be distributed across multiple
groups due to the practice of subcontracting stages of weapon
production and deployment [19,21,24]. IBC accurately reflects the
nature of Iraq’s armed conflict and the extent to which
perpetrators of violence can, and cannot, be identified, through
its three main perpetrator categories: Coalition forces, Anti-
Coalition forces, and Unknown perpetrators. Deaths are attribut-
ed to Coalition forces (which chiefly consist of US forces) when
data from reports identify Coalition perpetrators. Anti-Coalition
forces, although visually indistinguishable from civilians, are
identified as Anti-Coalition by their attack on a Coalition target
(which includes Coalition-associated targets, such as Iraqi police
checkpoints, Iraqi security forces, and government targets).
Unknown perpetrators are those who target civilians (i.e., no
identifiable military target is present), while appearing indistin-
guishable from civilians: for example, a suicide bomber disguised
as a civilian in a market. Unknown (i.e., unidentified) perpetrators
in Iraq include sectarian combatants and Anti-Coalition combat-
ants who maintain a civilian appearance while targeting civilians,
and criminals [19,21–23].
Statistical Analysis
Intercooled Stata 10.0 was used to calculate means, propor-
tions, and regressions. Maximum deaths are used for events
with reported minimum and maximum numbers because IBC
finds subsequent evidence usually confirms initial maximum
reports. Proportions were compared using chi-square testing,
and means using one-way ANOVA, to obtain two-tailed
p-values.
Results
Total Reported Civilian Violent Deaths over Time
Table 1 shows reported Iraqi civilian deaths from armed
violence for the period of March 20, 2003 through March 19,
2008, by responsible perpetrator and by postinvasion year. Among
the total 92,614 Iraqi civilian deaths from armed violence
documented for 2003–2008, Unknown perpetrators caused 74%
of all violent deaths of civilians (n=68,396); Coalition forces
caused 12% (n=11,516); Anti-Coalition forces caused 11%
(n=9,954); and 2% of civilian deaths were from military crossfire
where death could not be reliably attributed to a single perpetrator
(n=2,227). Of all years, the fourth postinvasion year (2006–2007)
had the greatest number of civilian deaths from violence
(n=30,571). During the first postinvasion year (March 2003–
March 2004), Coalition forces caused 52% of civilian deaths from
armed violence (n=7,252). In following years, the majority of
civilians were killed by Unknown perpetrators (range n=7,096 to
26,480 deaths per year, 61% to 87% of civilian deaths per year).
Table 1 shows the origins of violent death data for perpetrators
and years. We found that 65% of all deaths (n=60,481/92,614)
were documented from short-duration violent events that lasted 2
d or less. 35% of all deaths (n=32,133/92,614) were documented
from hospital and morgue aggregate reports or from long-duration
violent events lasting over 2 d, such as the first battle of Fallujah
(April–May 2004), the second battle of Fallujah (November–
December 2004), and prolonged events during the invasion
(March 20, 2003 to May 1, 2003).
Perpetrators and Their Weapons: Civilian Deaths in
Short-Duration Violence
We analyzed the effects of perpetrators and their weapons on
civilians using the dataset of 60,481 Iraqi civilian deaths from
14,196 short-duration violent events that caused at least one
reported civilian death. Reports on short-duration violent events
link perpetrators using particular methods in a specific time and
place to their resulting civilian deaths. Findings are of documented
deaths of individuals; they are not estimates. Other than Table 1,
all tables and figures describe deaths from short-duration violence
only and exclude the 32,133 deaths from reports of prolonged
violence lasting over 2 d and deaths reported only in aggregate
summaries (predominantly morgue-reported deaths from execu-
tions and small arms gunfire).
As shown in Table 2, one-third of deaths were in executions by
Unknown perpetrators (n=19,321/60,481, 32%). Unknown
perpetrators killed close to one-half of their victims by execution
(n=19,321/44,750, 43%), leaving marks of torture on 29% of
their executed victims (n=5,697/19,321). Among methods used
by Anti-Coalition forces, suicide bombers killed the greatest
proportion of Anti-Coalition civilian victims (n=3,333/9,511,
35%). Figure 1 shows Iraqi civilian deaths from Anti-Coalition
suicide bombers over time: deaths peaked in 2005, with substantial
deaths in 2004, and in mid-2006 to 2007. Among methods used by
Coalition forces, air attacks without ground fire killed the greatest
proportion of Coalition civilian victims (n=2,384/3,990, 60%;
Table 2). Figure 1 shows deaths from Coalition air attacks without
ground fire over time: A high peak of Iraqi civilian deaths from
Coalition air attacks occurred during the invasion in 2003, with
lower peaks in 2004 and in mid-2006 to 2007.
An additional measure of the civilian impact of perpetrators’
weapons is shown in Table 2: the mean (i.e., average) number of
civilian deaths from a short-duration violent event where a
perpetrator caused at least one civilian to die. The highest average
number of civilian deaths per event occurred when Unknown
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(Unknown suicide bombers, both on foot and in a vehicle, killed 19
civilians per lethal event), and from Coalition aerial bombings (17
civilian deaths per lethal event, p=0.8). Among Anti-Coalition
methods, Anti-Coalition suicide bombers on foot killed the most
Iraqi civilians per event (11 civilian deaths per lethal event),
significantly more than Anti-Coalition suicide bombers in vehicles
(seven civilian deaths per lethal event, p,0.01).
We compared mean numbers of civilians killed by lethal events
from different modes of delivery of improvised explosive devices
(IEDs) by comparing suicide bombs, vehicle bombs, and roadside
bombs. Table 2 shows that for both Unknown perpetrators and
Anti-Coalition perpetrators, suicide bomber IEDs killed the most
Iraqi civilians per lethal event, nonsuicide vehicle-borne IEDs less,
and roadside IEDs the least: Unknown perpetrators killed, on
average, 19 civilians per suicide bomber IED event, seven per
nonsuicide vehicle-borne IED event, and two per roadside IED
event (p,0.0001). Anti-Coalition perpetrators killed, on average,
eight civilians per suicide bomber IED event, five per nonsuicide
vehicle-borne IED event, and two per roadside IED event
(p,0.0001).
Geographic Distribution of Violent Deaths, Executions,
and Torture before Execution
Table 3 lists Iraq’s 18 governorates with their total reported
civilian deaths from short-duration violence, numbers, and
proportions executed by Unknown perpetrators, and numbers
and proportions whose bodies showed signs of torture before
execution. Baghdad governorate had the highest number of
civilian deaths from short-duration violence (n=27,050), with 43%
executed by Unknown perpetrators (n=11,728/27,050) including
14% tortured before execution (n=3,863/27,050). Wassit had a
relatively low number of violent deaths (n=1,503), but very high
proportions of deaths by execution (57%) and torture before
execution (21%). A factor in Wassit’s unusually high proportion of
reported executions is that the Tigris River flows from Baghdad
through Wassit by the town of Swaira, where a system of weirs,
originally designed to trap lily pads, catches corpses carried
Table 1. Number (%) of 92,614 Iraqi civilian deaths by perpetrator and postinvasion year: From all armed violence, from short-
duration violent events, and from long-duration violent events and aggregate reports.
Perpetrator
Reported Armed
Violence Deathsa,b,c 5-y Total Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
3/20/03–
3/19/08
3/20/03–
3/19/04
3/20/04–
3/19/05
3/20/05–
3/19/06
3/20/06–
3/19/07
3/20/07–
3/19/08
Unknown only
d All 68,396 (73.9) 5,655 (40.7) 7,096 (60.6) 12,868 (80.0) 26,480 (86.6) 16,297 (80.0)
Short-duration events 44,750 (48.3) 780 (5.6) 1,911 (16.3) 6,072 (37.8) 20,354 (66.6) 15,633 (76.7)
Long-duration and
aggregate
23,646 (25.5) 4,875 (35.1) 5,185 (44.3) 6,796 (42.3) 6,126 (20.0) 664 (3.3)
Coalition only All 11,516 (12.4) 7,252 (52.2) 2,175 (18.6) 530 (3.3) 693 (2.3) 866 (4.2)
Short-duration events 3,990 (4.3) 1,415 (10.2) 802 (6.9) 362 (2.3) 604 (2.0) 807 (4.0)
Long-duration and
aggregate
7,526 (8.1) 5,837 (42.0) 1,373 (11.7) 168 (1.0) 89 (0.3) 59 (0.3)
Anti-Coalition only
e All 9,954 (10.7) 608 (4.4) 1,877 (16.0) 2,388 (14.9) 2,670 (8.7) 2,411 (11.8)
Short-duration events 9,511 (10.3) 430 (3.1) 1,782 (15.2) 2,237 (13.9) 2,659 (8.7) 2,403 (11.8)
Long-duration and
aggregate
443 (0.5) 178 (1.3) 95 (0.8) 151 (0.9) 11 (0.0) 8 (0.0)
Crossfire,
$2 Perpetrators
All 2,227 (2.4) 335 (2.4) 506 (4.3) 228 (1.4) 642 (2.1) 516 (2.5)
Short-duration events 1,740 (1.9) 91 (0.7) 364 (3.1) 159 (1.0) 622 (2.0) 504 (2.5)
Long-duration and
aggregate
487 (0.5) 244 (1.8) 142 (1.2) 69 (0.4) 20 (0.0) 12 (0.0)
Other only
f All 521 (0.6) 37 (0.3) 46 (0.4) 60 (0.4) 86 (0.3) 292 (1.4)
Short-duration events 490 (0.5) 32 (0.2) 46 (0.4) 42 (0.3) 83 (0.3) 287 (1.4)
Long-duration and
aggregate
31 (0.03) 5 (0.0) 0 (0) 18 (0.1) 3 (0.0) 5 (0.0)
Totals All 92,614 (100.0) 13,887 (100.0) 11,700 (100.0) 16,074 (100.0) 30,571 (100.0) 20,382 (100.0)
Short-duration events 60,481 (65.3) 2,748 (19.8) 4,905 (41.9) 8,872 (55.2) 24,322 (79.6) 19,634 (96.3)
Long-duration and
aggregate
32,133 (34.7) 11,139 (80.2) 6,795 (58.1) 7,202 (44.8) 6,249 (20.4) 748 (3.7)
aDeaths from violent events of any duration that caused at least one reported civilian death and deaths from hospital and morgue aggregate reports (n=92,614).
bDeaths from short-duration violent events lasting 2 d or less that caused at least one reported civilian death (n=60,481).
cDeaths from long-duration violent events lasting over 2 d that caused at least one reported civilian death, and deaths from hospital and morgue aggregate reports
(n=32,133).
dUnknown perpetrators had a civilian target of attack, while themselves being indistinguishable from civilians (e.g., sectarian and Anti-Coalition combatants and
criminals that attacked civilians).
eAnti-Coalition forces were identified by the presence of a Coalition-associated target of attack, as they generally did not wear uniforms or distinguishing marks in
attacks.
fPrimarily Iraqi police and Iraqi military forces.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000415.t001
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PLoS Medicine | www.plosmedicine.org 5 February 2011 | Volume 8 | Issue 2 | e1000415downstream from Baghdad [25]. Dahuk had a high proportion of
executions (76%), but was based on a very small number of deaths
(n=19/25).
Figure 2 shows the overall relationship between nonexecution
violent deaths and deaths from Unknown perpetrators carrying
out extrajudicial executions in Iraq’s governorates. The statistically
significant, increasingly steep curve of the quadratic regression
indicates that as areas have higher numbers of nonexecution
violent deaths of civilians, they have increasingly higher numbers
of civilians executed by Unknown perpetrators. To illustrate: if
Figure 1. Monthly civilian deaths from Coalition air attacks and Anti-Coalition suicide bombers. Analysis of reported civilian deaths from
short-duration violent events lasting 2 d or less, March 20, 2003 through March 19, 2008.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000415.g001
Table 3. Civilian deaths from short-duration violent events in Iraq’s governorates.
Governorate
Deaths from Short-Duration
Armed Violence
n (%) Executed by
Unknown Perpetrators
n (%) Tortured before Execution
by Unknown Perpetrators
Baghdad 27,050 11,728 (43) 3,863 (14)
Diyala 8,177 2,339 (29) 552 (7)
Ninewa 5,248 1,148 (22) 173 (3)
Anbar 4,222 995 (24) 294 (7)
Salah al-Din 4,134 778 (19) 105 (3)
Babylon 3,696 761 (21) 223 (6)
Tameem 2,019 306 (15) 103 (5)
Wassit 1,503 849 (57) 310 (21)
Basrah 1,173 181 (15) 47 (4)
Najaf 1,040 11 (1) 0 (0)
Kerbala 826 102 (12) 10 (1)
Qadissiya 396 68 (17) 14 (4)
Erbil 295 4 (1) 0 (0)
Missan 251 16 (6) 3 (1)
Sulaymaniyah 155 12 (8) 0 (0)
Thi-Qar 168 0 (0) 0 (0)
Muthanna 69 3 (4) 0 (0)
Unknown 34 1 (3) 0 (0)
Dahuk 25 19 (76) 0 (0)
Total 60,481 19,321 (32) 5,697 (9)
Reported civilian deaths from short-duration violent events lasting 2 d or less, March 20, 2003 through March 19, 2008.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000415.t003
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PLoS Medicine | www.plosmedicine.org 6 February 2011 | Volume 8 | Issue 2 | e1000415starting with 1,000 nonexecution deaths, an additional 100
nonexecution deaths predicts an additional 22.4 execution deaths,
whereas if starting with 2,000 nonexecution deaths, an additional
100 nonexecution deaths predicts an additional 30.4 execution
deaths, with increasingly higher rates of execution deaths
occurring with higher numbers of nonexecution deaths. A
quadratic regression for torture before execution in Iraqi
governorates (unpublished data) similarly indicates that as
governorates have higher numbers of nonexecution violent deaths
of civilians, they have increasingly higher numbers of civilians
tortured before execution by Unknown perpetrators (executions
=(0.00002) (nonexecution deaths squared), t=43.99, R
2=0.9913,
p,0.001).
Perpetrators and Victim Demographics
On thebasis ofdemographic information in reports, weidentified
the 60,481 civilian victims of short-duration violence to be: 17,939
(29.7%) men; 1,981 (3.3%) women; 1,515 (2.5%) adults of
unreported sex; 2,146 (3.5%) children under age 18; and 36,900
(61.0%) civilian victims of unreported age. Among the 22,066 Iraqi
civilian victims demographically identifiable as men, women, or
children, 81.3% were men (n=17,939/22,066), 9.0% were women
(n=1,981/22,066), and 9.7% were children (n=2,146/22,066).
Because our earlier analysis of this dataset applied the category
of ‘‘female’’ rather than ‘‘woman’’ [10], we compared these
categorizations: Female deaths (n=2,396) consisted of 83% women
(n=1,981), 12% girls under age 18 (n=299), and 5% females
of unknown age (n=116), indicating substantial generalizability
between findings for females and women. Among 2,146 child
deaths, 559 (26.0%) were identified as boys, 299 (13.9%) as girls,
and 1,288 (60.0%) were children of unreported sex.
Table 4 shows victim demographics from perpetrators and their
specific methods of short-duration armed violence for 60,481 Iraqi
civilian deaths. Unknown perpetrators targeting civilians caused
66.9% of all violent deaths of civilian men (n=12,007/17,939),
mostly in executions (32.2%, n=5,768/17,939); 68.8% of all
violent deaths of women (n=1,363/1,981), mostly by gunfire
(21.1%, n=418/1,981); and 52.2% of all violent deaths of children
(n=1,120/2,146), again mostly by gunfire (9.8%, n=211/2,146).
Anti-Coalition forces caused 25.8% of violent deaths of civilian men
(n=4,629/17,939); 8.7% of violent deaths of women (n=173/
1,981); and 16.5% of violent deaths of children (n=355/2,146), in
all cases mostly by suicide bombing (7.9%, 4.0%, and 7.0%,
respectively). More women and children were killed by Anti-
Coalition suicide bombers in vehicles (n=210) than on foot (n=21).
Coalition forces caused 4.1% of violent deaths of civilian men
(n=741/17,939), mostly by gunfire (2.2%, n=390/17,939); 15.0%
of violent deaths of women (n=297/1,981), mostly by air attacks
without ground fire (9.7%, n=193/1,981); and 21.8% of violent
deaths of children (n=467/2,146), again mostly by air attacks
without ground fire (13.2%, n=284/2,146). For the 36,900 civilian
victims of unreported age, 78.8% were killed by Unknown
Figure 2. Iraqi governorates: nonexecution deaths versus executions by Unknown perpetrators. Analysis of reported civilian deaths
from short-duration violent events lasting 2 d or less, March 20, 2003 through March 19, 2008.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000415.g002
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n=12,988/36,900); 11.2% by Anti-Coalition forces (n=4,126/
36,900), mostly by suicide bombing (4.5%, n=1,656/36,900); and
6.6% by Coalition forces (n=2,438/36,900), mostly by air attacks
without ground fire (4.5%, n=1,674/36,900).
A comparison of Coalition and Anti-Coalition effects on Iraqi
women and children over time is made in Figure 3A, which shows
monthly raw numbers of women and children killed in short-
duration violence by Coalition forces (n=764) and Anti-Coalition
forces (n=528). Woman and child deaths from Coalition forces
peaked during the invasion in 2003, whereas those from Anti-
Coalition forces peaked in 2004–2005.
Another comparison of perpetrators’ civilian impact, made in
Table 4, uses the Woman and Child DWI to indicate the proportion
of a perpetrator’s victims who were women or children among their
civilian victims of known demographic status (possible DWI range 0–
100) [15]. Differences between the proportion of women and children
among civilians killed by perpetrators using each method were
statistically significant with p,0.001, except between Unknown and
Anti-Coalition perpetrators using execution with torture (DWI =4
versus DWI =0, p=0.13). The overall Woman and Child DWI for
all perpetrators and methods in Iraq combined during 2003–2008
was 18.7. For particular perpetrators and their methods, Woman and
Child DWIs suggest that the ‘‘dirtiest’’ effects in terms of causing the
highest rates of woman and child death were from Unknown
perpetrator mortar fire (DWI =79), from Coalition air attacks
without ground fire (DWI =69), and from Unknown perpetrator
nonsuicide vehicle bombs (DWI =54), for cases where at least 50
civilian deaths were reported from a perpetrator’s method.
Comparing civilian effects of opposing combatant forces, the
total Anti-Coalition Woman and Child DWI of 10 and the total
Coalition Woman and Child DWI of 51 suggest that Coalition
forces caused a significantly higher proportion of woman and child
deaths among its civilian deaths during 2003–2008 than did Anti-
Coalition forces (p,0.001). In Figure 3B, Coalition and Anti-
Coalition Woman and Child DWIs are shown over time. Linear
regression of Coalition monthly Woman and Child DWIs shows
that proportions of women and children among Coalition civilian
victims did not change significantly over 2003–2008 (slope
coefficient =0.0068, t=0.05, R
2=0,p=0.964). Linear regression
of Anti-Coalition monthly Woman and Child DWIs shows a
statistically significant downward trend in their Woman and Child
DWIs over 2003–2008 (slope coefficient =20.2894, t=23.20,
R
2=0.15, p=0.002).
Figure 3. Violent deaths of Iraqi women and children by Coalition and Anti-Coalition forces. Analysis of reported civilian deaths from
short-duration violent events lasting 2 d or less, March 20, 2003 through March 19, 2008. (A) Monthly numbers of women and children killed. (B)
Monthly Woman and Child Dirty War Index.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000415.g003
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Small arms firearms are designed to be carried by one
individual and include handguns, automatic weapons, assault
rifles, and machine guns [26]. Our data show that Unknown
perpetrators caused the most small arms deaths of Iraqi civilians
(n=8,086; Table 2) and of women and children (n=629; Table 4).
In contrast to Unknown perpetrators, who directly targeted
civilians, our data on civilian deaths from Anti-Coalition and
Coalition small arms were generally from attacks on military
targets, which permits direct comparison of the incidental
(sometimes described as ‘‘collateral’’) lethal effects on civilians
when these opposing forces used this common weapon-type in
Iraq’s conflict environment. As shown in Table 2, both Anti-
Coalition and Coalition forces killed an average of two Iraqi
civilians per short-duration event where their gunfire caused any
civilian death. In Figure 4A, which shows deaths over time, Iraqi
civilian deaths from Anti-Coalition gunfire (n=1,526) peaked in
2005, with another high, sustained peak from mid-2006 to mid-
2007. Civilian deaths from Coalition gunfire (n=987) peaked
during the invasion, with a lower, more sustained peak from mid-
2006 to mid-2007.
Demographic analysis of Coalition and Anti-Coalition small
arms civilian deaths (Table 4) indicates that Coalition gunfire
caused more woman and child deaths in raw numbers (n=178
versus n=25), and caused a significantly higher proportion of
woman and child deaths among civilian gunfire victims (DWI
=31 versus DWI =2, p,0.001). Figure 4B shows Coalition
monthly Woman and Child DWIs from small arms gunfire over
2003–2008. Linear regression of monthly Coalition DWIs suggests
that there was no statistically significant change in Woman and
Child DWIs from Coalition gunfire over the first 5 y of the war
(slope coefficient =20.0617, t=20.35, R
2=0.002, p=0.73).
Discussion
Conflict-associated violent mortality is a product of perpetrators’
behavior, their weapons technology, interactions between oppo-
nents, and context [27–29]. Our analysis shows how Iraqi civilian
deaths from perpetrators of violence during the first 5 y of the Iraq
war have varied over time, by geographic locale, according to
perpetrators’ weapons of choice, in demographic characteristics,
and according to whether or not civilians are targeted.
Figure 4. Civilian violent deaths from Coalition and Anti-Coalition small arms gunfire. Analysis of reported civilian deaths from short-
duration violent events lasting 2 d or less, March 20, 2003 through March 19, 2008. (A) Monthly numbers of civilians killed by Coalition and Anti-
Coalition gunfire. (B) Monthly Woman and Child Dirty War Index from Coalition gunfire.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000415.g004
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Three-quarters of Iraqi civilian victims of armed violence were
killed in direct targeting, either by sectarian or Anti-Coalition
combatants disguised as civilians, or by criminals (encompassed in
our Unknown perpetrator category). When any military combat-
ant intentionally targets civilians, this constitutes a war crime
[15,16,19,30]. Although a military force incurs primary respon-
sibility for its civilian victims, whether intended or unintended, a
possible factor affecting our comparison of civilian deaths from
Anti-Coalition forces and Coalition forces is that Coalition com-
batants present clear, uniformed military targets to Anti-Coalition
forces and are easily distinguished from Iraqi civilians. This would
decrease the Anti-Coalition likelihood of killing civilians accident-
ly. In contrast, Anti-Coalition combatants are visually indistin-
guishable from civilians during military actions and often fight
from among civilians; practices that violate laws of war, displace
their own risk as combatants onto Iraqi civilians, and predictably
contribute to civilian deaths [15,19,30–32].
Perpetrators and Explosive Weapons
Recent reports have emphasized the potential high risk to
civilians from explosive weapons [5,8,33]. This concern is sup-
ported by our findings for Iraq. For events that caused a civilian
death, the greatest average numbers of civilian deaths per event
resulted from Unknown perpetrator suicide bombings and from
Coalition air attacks. Civilian deaths from air attacks, which
typically involve bombs or missiles, peaked during the invasion. Of
all methods used by Unknown and Anti-Coalition perpetrators,
suicide bombers killed the greatest numbers of Iraqi civilians per
event. Unknown perpetrator suicide bombers directed against
‘‘soft,’’ civilian targets killed 11 more Iraqi civilians per event than
Anti-Coalition suicide bombers directed against ‘‘hard,’’ Coalition
targets (19 versus 8, p,0.001). Our findings support descriptions
by others of suicide attacks as the ‘‘mass destruction’’ weapon of
sectarian and Anti-Coalition forces in Iraq [17,21,22,34,35] and as
the most lethal terrorist method internationally [34].
Extrajudicial Executions
Execution by Unknown perpetrators was the most prevalent
form of violent death affecting Iraqi civilians in 2003–2008.
Although Unknown perpetrators’ motivations cannot be ascer-
tained from our data, our findings are compatible with descriptive
reports of Iraq’s postinvasion environment in this period, during
which civilians were extensively abducted, ransomed, exchanged,
and executed for financial or political gain, to destabilize Iraqi
society, or to punish or deter ‘‘collaborators,’’ by perpetrators who
strategically remained unidentifiable and who included a mixture
of criminals, and sectarian and Anti-Coalition combatants,
including within Iraqi security forces and police [17,19,21–
24,35–37].
Our findings on the geographic distribution and nature of violent
death across Iraq’s governorates show that deaths from executions,
and executions with torture, progressively and disproportionately
increased as deaths from other forms of violence increased. Further
quantitative and qualitative study is needed to identify reasons
behind this finding. We speculate that increased numbers of civilian
violent deaths in governorates may indicate environments of lower
security and greater impunity, which allow perpetrators to increase
the scale of systematic use of executions—a cheap, low-technology
form of armed violence—for purposes of retribution, punishment,
intimidation, and financial gain. In Iraq, torture before execution
and methods of disposal of corpses often leave mutilated bodies to
be discovered [24,25,38]. In this way, perpetrators in Iraq may use
bodies of tortured victims to send a message, to terrorize, to clear
territory, to display the cost of resisting their power, to destabilize
security [17,24], or to increase the stakes in future ransom of
abductees. On an individual level, increased exposure to violence,
which can cause desensitization and peer-induced escalation [29],
may disproportionately increase numbers of individuals willing to
perpetrate executions or the propensity of perpetrators to inflict
torture on captives.
Perpetrators’ Effects on Men, Women, and Children
Our demographic analysis shows that Iraqi civilian men are the
main civilian victims of lethal armed violence in this war, as in
other wars [17,18], despite having the same protected civilian
status as women and children civilians under laws of war [16,39].
Because women and children are less targeted in Iraq’s conflict, we
use a Woman and Child DWI measuring the proportion of
women and children among civilian victims of known demo-
graphic status to indicate relatively indiscriminate weapons or
weapons-use in comparisons between perpetrators. Indiscriminate
weapons and indiscriminate use of weapons are prohibited under
laws of war [5,8,15,16]. Although our Woman and Child DWI
findings are not direct assessments of the legality of military actions
under laws of war, and are subject to limitations discussed below,
they can be useful to signal relatively higher-risk indiscriminate
effects of perpetrator’s weapons on women and children. We
found the highest risks for indiscriminate effects on women and
children when civilians were killed were from: Unknown
perpetrators using mortars against civilians, Unknown perpetra-
tors using nonsuicide vehicle bombs against civilians, and
Coalition air attacks without ground fire, involving bombs or
missiles. Compared to Anti-Coalition forces, Coalition forces
caused a higher total Woman and Child DWI for 2003–2008, with
no evidence of a significant decrease over time. Face validity of our
findings on the Woman and Child DWI for Iraq’s conflict
environment is suggested by demographic data recently released
by the Government of Iraq on 4,068 civilian violent deaths in
2009: 3,267 men, 439 women, and 362 children [40]. The
Woman and Child DWI generated from Government of Iraq data
for 2009 is 19.7 (DWI =439+362/439+362+3,2676100), which
does not differ significantly from our overall Woman and Child
DWI of 18.7 for 2003–2008 (p=0.14).
Our temporal analysis of Coalition weapon-effects showed that
numbers ofwoman and child deaths, andnumbers of civilian deaths
from air attacks, peaked during the invasion of March 20, 2003 to
May 1, 2003, when the Coalition used heavy air power. Our
findings are consistent with the 2004 Iraq Living Conditions Survey
(ILCS), which found that of Iraqis chronically disabled from war
injuries inflicted in the first year of this war, half of disabled adults
werewomen, and over 15% of the disabled werechildren under age
10—unusually high proportions—with the civilian population most
affected [41]. These findings, combined with the high Woman and
Child DWI outcomes from air attacks, suggest that heavy reliance
on air power during the invasion may have been particularly costly
for Iraqi civilians—and especially for women and children—in
terms of deaths and injuries. Our findings support the view that
indiscriminate lethal effects of explosive aerial weapons on civilians
need to be addressed through changed practice and policy on the
use of air power in armed conflict, with air attacks on populated
areas prohibitedor systematically monitored to demonstrate civilian
protection [5,8,10,33].
Small Arms Gunfire
Most civilian deaths from small arms gunfire were caused by
Unknown perpetrators targeting civilians. Although Anti-Coalition
forces and Coalition forces caused the same average number of
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military targets, our findings suggest that Coalition gunfire had a
more indiscriminate effect on Iraqi women and children. A
possible factor may be that Anti-Coalition forces often wage battle
amid or near civilians, sometimes from homes with women and
children, thereby placing these civilians at risk of Coalition fire
[30,31]. Also, we counted among Anti-Coalition civilian victims
Iraqi police who were killed while in civil roles at Coalition-
associated targets such as police stations, academies or check-
points. Male dominance of this targeted profession may have
lowered Anti-Coalition Woman and Child DWIs from small arms,
and from other Anti-Coalition weapons. Possible contributing
Coalition factors include reports of indiscriminate or dispropor-
tionate Coalition gunfire during raids on Iraqi homes [30,42], into
urban residential surroundings [30,42], and near convoys and
roadside checkpoints [17,23,30,42,43] when perceiving threat,
when attacked and after being attacked [17,23,30]. It has been
suggested that Coalition troops may have fired more indiscrim-
inately when shifted rapidly between roles of active combat and
civilian engagement, and when in conditions of inadequate
training and interpreters, poorly marked checkpoints, or low
accountability [30,42,43]. Although it has been reported that these
problems were addressed [30,43] and that civilian deaths from
Coalition gunfire decreased as a result [30], our data show no
evidence of a significant decrease in numbers of civilian deaths
from Coalition gunfire during the period of our study, or in
Woman and Child DWIs. Our findings suggest that relatively
indiscriminate effects from Coalition gunfire persisted over 5 y
postinvasion, and that military efforts to minimize civilian
casualties need to be coupled with systematic monitoring of
casualties in order to assess and strengthen civilian protection.
Limitations
We do not examine indirect deaths from war, deaths of
combatants, or perpetrators’ patterns of civilian deaths after the
first 5 y of the war. Although it is not possible for this paper to
describe detailed, event-based demographic, temporal, and
geographic patterns of civilian deaths from perpetrators and their
weapons that occurred after our study’s 5-y time-period (March
20, 2003 to March 19, 2008), we can provide an overview based
on the public database of the IBC Web site [13]: Monthly rates of
Iraqi civilian deaths from armed violence averaged 1,518 deaths
per month for the period of our study, then began to decline in
May of 2008. Since July 2008, deaths have persistently varied
between 200 to under 600 per month, averaging 401 deaths per
month. This paper’s analysis of 92,614 civilian deaths from armed
violence covers 86% of all 108,107 Iraqi civilian deaths from
armed violence recorded by IBC from the beginning of the Iraq
war to the latest available date in November 2010. Our findings do
not represent total violent deaths or events affecting Iraqi civilians,
as not every death or event are reported. For deaths from
perpetrators’ weapon-types, we only analyzed those attributable to
single weapon-types and single perpetrators in short-duration
events. This analysis understates total absolute numbers killed by
each perpetrator’s weapon-type, but increases reliability in
attributing deaths and allows comparison of proportional effects
within a uniform time-frame.
In attributing civilian deaths to perpetrators, Coalition forces
are generally identifiable, so Coalition-induced civilian deaths are
directly measured. In contrast, Anti-Coalition forces are indirectly
identified by their Coalition target; a necessarily conservative
identification of Anti-Coalition perpetrators for accuracy because
Anti-Coalition forces routinely avoid identification by uniforms or
markings. Anti-Coalition-caused deaths identified in this dataset
therefore only represent civilians killed by Anti-Coalition military
targeting. An unknown, additional number were killed in direct
civilian targeting by unidentifiable Anti-Coalition forces, included
within our category of Unknown perpetrators, whose findings as a
whole can be understood to represent direct civilian targeting. A
factor that increases child deaths from Coalition forces is the use
by Anti-Coalition forces of children age 10 to 17 in attacks against
Coalition forces [44–46]. Use of child soldiers is against laws of
war and a war crime if the child is under age 15 [15,16]. Although
quantitative data are very limited [44–46], child soldiers are not
prevalent in Iraq’s conflict. However, some child deaths in our
study are likely to be of children placed in combatant roles at their
time of death.
Although we know of no evidence that media coverage bias
affects armed conflict reporting on civilian victim sex or age, we
consider it possible that media reports may identify women and
children more readily than men civilians among the dead, perhaps
for human interest or from a normative assumption that a victim
of armed violence is a man unless stated otherwise. If this bias
exists it could inflate woman and child percentage findings among
civilian deaths generally for all perpetrators and weapons. Indirect
evidence against this bias is the similar proportions of women and
children among violent deaths of civilian men, women, and
children found from our IBC data for 2003–2008 and from
Government of Iraq data for 2009 (DWI =18.7% versus DWI
=19.7%, respectively) [40]. (Government data on victim demo-
graphics are unavailable for 2003–2008.) However, until more
directly comparable data are available for replication, we suggest
that our Woman and Child DWI findings should be considered
robust indicators of the relative demographic characteristics of
civilian deaths, rather than absolute proportions of civilian deaths.
There is no evidence to suggest that differential reporting bias
between perpetrators or weapons affects our comparisons of mean
numbers of civilians killed per event or of proportions of women
and children among civilian deaths (e.g., that woman and child
deaths are more likely to be reported than men for one perpetrator
than another, or for one weapon than another). However, our
Woman and Child DWI findings should be considered suggestive
until careful studies for possible reporting bias are done. Although
we show in Table 4 unreported demographic data for readers’
information (civilian victims of unreported age, children of
unreported sex, and in the footnote, adults of unreported sex),
assessment for bias in reporting demographic information requires
knowing the true demographic composition of the unknowns
within this dataset, or comparison to a matched, independent
dataset of comparable detail. A study using the IBC database
found no media-reporting bias for governorates with higher levels
of insurgent violence to have any more, or less, missing infor-
mation on event location, but missing demographic information
was not examined [47]. It has been established that media reports
can provide systematic, meaningful data on conflict casualties
[1,7,10,11,34,48–50]. A general limitation of conflict studies that
use media reports is that journalists collect information in their
reports for purposes other than systematic inquiry and, as we
illustrate here, study is needed to assess possible bias in media
reports describing perpetrators, weapons, and victims of armed
conflict. Establishing standards for reporting victim information
could maximize the contribution of media reports to understand-
ing violence.
A strength of our study is its use of verifiable data on 92,614
actual civilian deaths from armed violence. Surveys extrapolate
from relatively few actual violent deaths, e.g., 164 violent deaths in
the Iraq Family Health Survey (IFHS) of 9,345 households [51],
with few deaths traceable to specific weapons or events. Although
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mortality data, they can be affected by recall bias, reporting bias,
survival bias, and difficulties in implementation [3,47,52,53].
IBC’s monitoring using daily-collated data minimizes recall bias
(99% of events were investigated and reported within 24 h [13])
and permits surveillance over time of traceable events—valuable
attributes for monitoring and analyzing conflict mortality trends
[3,7,48,51]. IBC data correlate with IFHS data showing similar
trends and distribution of violent deaths by governorate [51] and
with ILCS data [41] for war-related deaths by governorate [54],
with some differences because the surveys did not always
differentiate combatant from civilian deaths, as is often the case
in surveys owing to sensitivity, danger, or response unreliability
[52,55,56]. Clinical studies can provide data on civilian conflict
mortality from weapon-types. However, most clinical studies use
aggregate hospital samples untraceable to causative events or
perpetrators, and results can be biased by prehospital patterns of
mortality that vary by weapon or injury, and by local treatment
access and quality [57–61].
Our analysis describes only violence that resulted in a civilian
death. As of the time of writing this paper, military actors have not
released systematic data on their use of weapons in events that
leave civilians unharmed; data that would allow analysis of their
practice of civilian-protective warfare. Anti-Coalition forces
release no data on use of weapons, and among Coalition forces,
the US Air Force has released only partial data on some types of
air strikes and munitions dropped in Iraq, without systematic
reports of actions that caused or avoided civilian casualties [62–
65]. The recent, unauthorized release of US Army SIGACT
(significant activity) records covering 2004–2009 by WikiLeaks will
yield data on weapons, perpetrators, and casualties from the
perspective of the US military, but will require time for careful
analysis [66]. Use of transparent, verifiable systems for tracking
and measuring civilian and combatant casualties from all military
actions could identify civilian-protective tactics (e.g., careful tar-
geting, or less frequent use of weapons) and would allow rapid
identification, correction, and deterrence of civilian-harmful tac-
tics (e.g., use of indiscriminate weapons near civilians) [8,15,67].
Improved civilian protection decreases preventable civilian deaths,
physical injuries, and psychological injuries, such as the increased
mental disorders found in Iraqi citizens exposed to bomb blasts,
mutilated bodies, and gunfire [68]. Our findings on civilian deaths
from perpetrators and their weapons during 5 y of the Iraq war
illustrate the feasibility as well as the public health and
humanitarian potential of detailed tracking of war’s effects on a
civilian population.
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Background. Civilian deaths through armed violence is a
public health and humanitarian problem in all wars, despite
internationally agreed humanitarian standards regarding the
treatment of civilians during wars—so-called laws of war
such as the Geneva Conventions. Since the Iraq war began
on March 20, 2003, when a multilateral force led by US and
UK troops invaded Iraq, more than 100,000 Iraqi civilians
(women, children, noncombatants, and police carrying out
nonparamilitary duties) have died because of armed vio-
lence, according to the Iraq Body Count (IBC), a non-
governmental project that collates media reports of deaths
of individual Iraqi civilians and cross-checks these reports
with data from hospitals, morgues, nongovernmental organi-
zations, and official figures. Indeed, according to a recent
assessment of the global burden of armed violence, in 2006,
people living in Iraq had the highest risk of dying violently
in conflict. In that year, there were 91 violent deaths per
100,000 people in the country.
Why Was This Study Done? Detailed analysis of civilian
deaths during wars is important because it can improve the
understanding of the impact of these deaths on general
public health and on vulnerable subgroups in the population.
In addition, data collected on the nature and effects of
violence can guide the development of preventative policies.
For example, an analysis that reveals that air attacks by
invading troops cause a high proportion of civilian deaths
might encourage policy changes that prohibit air attacks on
populated areas. Finally, by linking violent deaths to
perpetrators, analyses of civilian deaths can provide an
indicator of combatants’ compliance with the laws of war,
which require the protection of civilians from targeted or
indiscriminate harm. Here, IBC researchers provide a
descriptive statistical analysis of Iraqi civilian deaths directly
caused by perpetrators of armed violence during the first 5
years of the Iraq war.
What Did the Researchers Do and Find? According to
data from the Iraq Body Count, more than 92,000 Iraqi
civilians died because of armed violence during this period.
Coalition forces (identified by uniforms) caused 12% of these
deaths, anti-coalition forces (un-uniformed combatants
identified by attacks on coalition targets) caused 11% of
the deaths; and unknown perpetrators, who targeted
civilians and were indistinguishable from their victims (for
example, a suicide bomber in a market), were responsible for
three-quarters of civilian deaths. To link individual deaths
with perpetrators and their methods, the researchers
analyzed the 60,481 civilian deaths caused by short-
duration events of lethal violence (events that lasted less
than 24 hours and that occurred in a specific location; for
example, overnight air strikes). Extrajudicial executions by
unknown perpetrators were responsible for one-third of
these deaths and disproportionately increased as deaths
from other forms of violence increased across Iraq. Unknown
perpetrator suicide bombings that targeted civilians and
coalition aerial bombings killed most civilians per lethal
event (19 and 17 deaths per lethal event on average,
respectively). Finally, the researchers calculated the
proportion of women and children among civilian deaths.
Because men are the main targets of armed violence, this
proportion—the ‘‘Dirty War Index’’ (DWI)—indicates the
scale of indiscriminate killing in a conflict. The most
indiscriminate effects on women and children in Iraq were
from unknown perpetrators firing mortars (DWI =79) and
nonsuicide vehicle bombs (DWI =54), and from coalition air
attacks (DWI =69). Coalition forces had a higher DWI than
anti-coalition forces for all weapons combined, with no
decrease over the study period.
What Do These Findings Mean? These findings show
that during the first 5 years of the Iraq war, civilian deaths
varied over time and location and in terms of victim
characteristics and targeting of civilians. Although limited
to direct deaths and possibly subject to some media bias,
these findings show that most civilian deaths were inflicted
by unknown perpetrators, and that unknown perpetrators
had particularly lethal and indiscriminate effects on Iraqi
civilians. However, they also show that Coalition forces had
indiscriminate lethal effects on civilian populations. In part,
this may be because Coalition forces had a high risk of killing
civilians accidentally because they could not easily recognize
anti-coalition combatants fighting without uniforms among
civilians. Nevertheless, the relatively indiscriminate effects of
Coalition aerial weapons highlight the need to change
policies relating to the use of air power in future armed
conflicts.
Additional Information. Please access these Web sites via
the online version of this summary at http://dx.doi.org/10.
1371/journal.pmed.1000415.
N ThisstudyisfurtherdiscussedinaPLoS MedicinePerspective
by Robert Muggah
N The International Committee of the Red Cross provides
information about war and International humanitarian law
(in several languages)
N The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Develop-
ment Web site provides information on the global burden
of armed violence
N More details on the Iraq Body Count are available
N The HumanSecurity Report Project tracks globaland regional
trends in organized violence, their causes, and consequences
N Every Casualty supports and is a resource for the documen-
tation of individual casualties of armed conflict
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